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Loan Portfolio Swaps Under Capital Regulation and  
Deposit Insurance: A Bilateral Approach 
 
 
Abstract: Using a bilateral approach, we document a loan portfolio swap for lending 
management.  This swap provides insurance against credit-related losses through 
diversification.  We find that the bank’s optimal non-swap-performing 
(swap-performing) loan rate is negatively (positively) related to its credit 
improvement, to its counterparty’s credit deterioration, to the capital-to-deposits ratio, 
and to the deposit insurance premium under strategic substitutes if the bank is 
sufficiently powerful in the two loan markets.  The most obvious application of our 
result is to the theory of how a bank should select a lending portfolio to compete.  
The strategic effect on one lending market in another market must be considered.  
Our findings provide alternative explanations for loan portfolio swap transactions 
concerning bank loan-rate-setting behavior and regulation. 
 
Keywords: Loan Portfolio Swap; Loan-Rate Setting; Capital Regulation; 
Deposit Insurance 
JEL Classification: G13, G21 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Berger (2003) presented statistics that illustrate some of the changes in 
performance and structure of the banking industry in the United States.  The annual 
average growth rate of gross total assets in the industry was only 3.0% during the 
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period 1984-2001.  However, the annual average growth in the notional interest-rate 
swap value was 27.9% in real terms during that period.  Longstaff, Santa-Clara, and 
Schwartz (2001) pointed out that the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) reported that the total notional amount for swap-related derivatives 
outstanding at the end of 1997 was over $4.9 trillion.  This was more than 300 times 
the $15 billion notional for all Chicago Board of Treasury notes and bond futures 
options combined.  These statistical data motivate this analysis, contributing to a 
view of evolution in development of swap-related derivatives and bank lending under 
the authority regulation. 
 
Banks and regulatory authorities must always deal with asset quality problems.  
Many banks have experienced borrower defaults due to their exposure to specialized 
debts, such as agricultural and industrial loans.  One risk of bank lending is credit 
risk, the risk of borrower default.  Neal (1996) pointed out that the credit risk faced 
by a bank is sufficiently high for two reasons.  First, banks with loan portfolios are 
usually concentrated in particular industries or geographic areas, have limited ability 
to diversify the credit risk across borrowers.  Second, credit risk is pre-dominated 
because the credit risk premium is fixed when the loan is made to a business.  Under 
these circumstances, a bank tends to conduct a credit derivative to manage and control 
the credit risk from potential asset quality problems.*  As Neal suggests, a loan 
portfolio swap is a credit derivative that provides insurance against credit-related 
losses through diversification.  Thus, banks have defaults due not only to an 
exposure to common risk factors, but also to firm-specific risks that are termed 
counterparty risks.  The counterparty risk is important to loan portfolio swaps.  The 
                                                           
* Neal (1996) suggested three types of credit derivatives: credit swaps, credit options, and credit-linked 
notes, and show how they manage and control credit risk.  A loan portfolio swap discussed in this 
paper is a type of credit swap. 
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issues of how credit states and regulation conditions jointly determine the optimal 
bank interest margin, which is the difference between the interest rates the bank 
charges borrowers and the rate the bank pays to depositors, deserve closer scrutiny. 
 
Academic interest in analyzing swap default risk is not new.†  Depending on the 
specifics of the credit derivative instrument, Jarrow and Yu (2001) demonstrated that 
default risk can enter in the following three ways.  First, in the case of an 
over-the-counter options contract, credit sensitivity can be associated with the 
underlying asset on which the contract is written, or it can be associated with the 
writer of the contract.  The options contract subject to default is said to the be 
“vulnerable.”  Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), for example, provided a model to price 
vulnerable options.  Second, in the case of interest rate swap, credit risk is viewed as 
a two-sided state because both parties in the swap can default.  Duffie and Huang 
(1996), and Jarrow and Turnbull (1997), established reduced-form models on 
two-sided default risk applied to swaps.  Third, in the case of a default swap, the 
default risk of the two counterparties and the reference asset must be considered 
simultaneously.  Jarrow and Yu, for example, focused on the counterparty risk and 
the pricing of defaultable securities. 
 
Despite these complexities, the pricing of credit derivatives is easily managed by 
the martingale pricing technique.  In the following literature review, we focus on 
default swaps.  Whittaker (1987) used an option approach to exogenously value the 
credit exposure of interest rate swaps.  Cooper and Mello (1991) analyzed the 
 
exchange of financial claims from risk swap under the option-pricing framework, and 
                                                           
† For example, see Cooper and Mello (1991), and Sorensen and Bollier (1994). 
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showed that the equilibrium swaps in a perfect market transfer wealth from 
shareholders to debt holders.  Sorensen and Bollier (1994) used a bilateral model to 
price swap default risk.  The primary determinants in Sorensen and Bollier’s model 
included the two parties’ credit conditions and the shape and volatility of the yield 
curve.  Neal presented three new financial instruments (credit swaps, credit options, 
and credit-linked notes) for controlling credit risk, and showed that there is a strong 
relation between the credit rating and the credit risk premium: the higher the credit 
rating, the lower the credit premium.  Duffie and Huang developed a model for 
valuing swap claims subject to default by both contracting parties.  Duffie and 
Huang’s model demonstrated that the anticipated variation in the credit quality of the 
contracting parties over the life of the swap is an important factor to determine an 
optimal swap rate between contracting parties.  Using a string market model, 
Longstaff, Santa-Clara, and Schwarz solved the correlation matrix implied by 
swaptions and examined the relative valuation of caps and swaptions. 
 
In the above literature, the authors used the Markowitz-Tobin portfolio-theoretic 
approach as their analytical apparatus concerning the pricing of default risk.  The 
principal advantage of this approach is the explicit treatment of uncertainty, which has 
long played a crucial role in swaptions discussions.  However, this approach omits 
important aspects of behavioral swap participation modes, specifically banks.  It is 
assumed that under the portfolio-theoretic approach of loan portfolio swaps, loan 
markets are perfectly competitive so that quantity setting and rate taking are the 
relevant behavioral modes in the markets.  This assumption is not applicable to loan 
markets because such markets are always concentrated in particular industries or 
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geographic areas where the banks set rates.‡ 
 
In addition, those authors, except Sorensen and Bollier, and Jarrow and Yu, used a 
unilateral perspective in pricing default risk.  This unilateral default exposure may 
exist because one party has no probability for default under any future economic 
scenario.  Such an exposure may also exist if most of the swap’s expected future 
values or replacement costs are negative to one party and positive to the counterparty 
under any future interest rate scenario.  However, if both parties have some degree of 
default risk, there should be a bilateral perspective in pricing default risk.  The 
pricing of the risk will depend on a combination of the two parties credit conditions. 
 
A loan-rate-setting bank needs to value claims subject to default risk when it 
conducts loan portfolio swaps.  Bank regulators require a consistent method for 
measuring the potential default risk so that they are able to set appropriate capital 
requirements to regulate the bank’s asset quality.  Concerns about bank asset quality 
and bank failures have promoted bank regulators to adopt a risk-based system of 
capital standards.  The regulators designed a system to force bank capital positions to 
reflect their asset portfolio risks.  It is of interest to study this capital regulation 
affecting bank loan rates and thus bank profits and risks under loan portfolio swaps. 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a model that integrates the 
bilateral loan portfolio swap considerations in the portfolio-theoretic approach with 
the market conditions, and loan-rate-setting behavioral modes of the firm-theoretic 
                                                           
‡ Klein (1970) is among the first to question the applicability of the portfolio approach to intermediary 
behavior and shows that some basic theorems of portfolio theory are not applicable under imperfectly 
competitive market structures.  Hancock (1986) demonstrated bank loan-rate-setting modes of 
behavior. 
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approach under capital regulation and deposit insurance.  Our model applies the 
Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing to value the bank’s capital equity.  The 
comparative statical results from this model present the influences of the bank’s (and 
its counterparty’s) credit deterioration/improvement, capital regulation, and deposit 
insurance on the bank’s optimal loan rate for the loan portfolio swap.  We show that 
under strategic substitutes in the bank’s risky-asset portfolio, the bank’s optimal loan 
rate for the loan portfolio swap is a decreasing function of its credit improvement, its 
counterparty’s credit deterioration, the capital-to-deposits ratio, and the deposit 
insurance premium when the bank has a greater market power.  Therefore, this 
model provides an alternative explanation for a credit derivative loan portfolio swap 
for managing credit risk concerning bank loan-rate-setting behavior and regulation. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the basic 
framework for the model.  Section III derives and discusses the equilibrium of the 
model.  Section IV analyzes the comparative static results.  Section V concludes. 
 
 
II.  The Model 
 
Consider a bank that makes decisions during a single-period horizon.  The loan 
portfolio swap presented in this paper highlights the economic substance of the model.  
At the beginning of the period, when the capital constraint is binding, the bank has the 
following balance sheet: 
 
)11(* +=+=++
q
KKDBLL                                        (1) 
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where L  and *L  are the amounts of two heterogeneous loans, B  is a composite 
variable denoting the bank’s net position in the interbank market, D  is the quantity 
of deposit, and K  is the stock of equity capital.  The bank is a lender in the 
interbank market when 0>B , and a borrower when 0<B .  Further, the bank can 
lend and borrow in the interbank market at a known rate R .  The bank provides 
depositors with a rate of return equal to the risk-free rate, DR .  The bank is fully 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and pays an insurance 
premium of P  per dollar of deposits.  Our model assumes that K  is fixed over the 
period, and this equity capital held by the bank is tied by regulation to be a fixed 
proportion )(q  of the bank’s deposits, qDK ≥ .  We assumed that the required 
capital-to-deposits ratio )(q  is an increasing function of the amount of the loans ( L  
and *L ) held by the bank at the beginning of the period, 0'>q .  Zarruk and Madura 
(1992) demonstrated that this required minimum capital-to-deposits ratio is 
risk-based.§ 
 
Without loss of generality, we assumed that loans L(  and )*L  granted by the 
bank belong to two classes of fixed-rate claims with one-period maturity.  L  and 
*L  are the total lending amount, where 0>L  is treated as the amount of 
non-swap-performing (NSP) loans and 0* >L  is the amount of swap-performing (SP) 
loans in the bank’s loan portfolio.  This portfolio is composed of some combination 
of the NSP and SP loans since the bank tends to reduce risk through diversification.  
We assume that the bank has some market power in lending (see Cosimano and 
                                                           
§ Risk-based capital is based on assets, specifically the composition of assets.  In this paper, the bank 
maximizes the market value of equity under its balance sheet constraint.  Using the capital-to-deposits 
ratio or capital-to-loans formula ratio affects none of the qualitative results in the model.  However, an 
advantage of capital-to-deposits ratio used in this paper is for purposes of simplicity of calculation.  
Further, Our model assumes that q  is an increasing function of L  and *L .  Adding this 
complexity affects none of the qualitative results as well. 
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McDonald, 1998).  Both loan markets are imperfect in the sense that the bank is a 
loan-rate setter.  Both loan demands are specified by a downward-sloping function, 
),( *LL RRLL =  and ),(
***
LL RRLL = , where LR  is the loan rate of L , with 
0<∂∂ LRL  and 022 <∂∂ LRL , and *LR  is the loan rate of *L , with 0** <∂∂ LRL  
and 0
2**2 <∂∂ LRL .  In addition, L  and *L  are substitutes when 0* >∂∂ LRL  
)0( * >∂∂ LL RL  and complements when 0* <∂∂ LRL  )0( * <∂∂ LL RL . 
 
Neal pointed out that credit swaps are appealing to commercial banks whose loan 
portfolios are concentrated in particular industries or geographic areas.  Neal’s 
observation allows a loan-setting bank (e.g., an industrial bank) to swap the payments 
from some of its loans for payments from a different bank (called its counterparty, e.g., 
an agricultural bank) rather than lending outside its local area or selling some loans 
and purchasing others to diversify the credit risk.  Our model assumes that a part of 
the loan portfolio granted by the bank’s counterparty belongs to a single class of 
fixed-rate )( AR  claims with one-period maturity.  The bank’s counterparty operates 
its lending business in an imperfectly competitive loan market, and the demand for 
loans faced by the counterparty is a downward-sloping function, )( AAA RLL = , where 
0<∂∂ AA RL  and 0
22 <∂∂ AA RL .  AL  can be treated as a multiple-loan function; 
however, adding this complexity affects none of the qualitative results.  
 
The loan portfolio swap in this paper consists of an agreement between two banks 
to exchange in the future two streams of loan payments.  Even though a loan 
portfolio swap reduces the credit risk through diversification, loans are still risky 
because they are subject to non-performance due to, e.g., operational risk, 
counterparty risk, liquidity risk and legal risk.  Default risk is often a two-way 
 9
proposition in the case of swap transactions.  If both parties do not have perfect 
information about each other’s credit, frictions may arise.  The replacement cost 
valuation should be adjusted to accommodate a two-way analysis.  We used 
Sorensen and Bollier’s bilateral approach to price the credit risk from the loan losses 
at the end of the period, and value the bank’s credit risk, *LCR , in the following: 
 
 )()1(),()1( ** *** AAALLLLAL RLRRRLRCR +−+= αα                       (2) 



≠
=
existent :riskcredit            0
existent-non :riskcredit            0
   
 
where ),()1( *** LLL RRLR+  is the value of the option for the bank to replace the swap, 
)()1( AAA RLR+  is the value of the option for the bank’s counterparty to replace the 
swap, Aα  is the probability that the bank’s counterparty will default on the single 
default date, and *Lα  is the probability of ),()1(
***
LLL RRLR+  defaulting. 
 
From the bank’s viewpoint, we used Equation (2) to analyze the interchanging 
effect between ),()1( *** LLL RRLR+  and )()1( AAA RLR+ , and to value the credit risk 
in the model.  If the option to receive a fixed loan payment is equal to option to pay a 
fixed loan payment: )()1(),()1( *** AAALLL RLRRRLR +=+ , the direction of the 
midmarket credit risk adjustment depends on the ratio between the probability 
defaulting by the two swap parties.  If the credit conditions for the two swap parties 
are equal: AL αα =* , the direction of the adjustment depends on the difference 
between the two parties’ options.  Under these circumstances, the bank’s value 
earned from its risky assets during the period is: 
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






+++−++≠
+++−++=
existent :riskcredit       
),()1()()1)(1(),()1(
existent-non :riskcredit       
),()1()()1)(1(),()1(
),(
****
****
*
*
*
LLLAAAALLLL
LLLAAAALLLL
LL
RRLRRLRRRLR
RRLRRLRRRLR
RRV
αα
αα
(3) 
 
Given the balance sheet constraint, the bank’s value earned from its earning-asset 
portfolio under credit swap transaction is: 
 
)],(),()11()[1(),( **** LLLLLL RRLRRLq
KRRRVA −−+++=                  (4) 
 
The residual value of the bank after meeting all of its debt obligations is the value 
of the bank’s equity capital at the end of the period.  Thus,  
 



≤
>−
=
)(solvency   if                  0
)(solvency   if           
ZA
ZAZA
S                                 (5) 
 
where )),(),,(()1( *** LLLLLD RRLRRLCPDDRZ +++= , 0>∂∂ LCL , 
022 >∂∂ LCL , 0* >∂∂ LCL , and 0
2*2 >∂∂ LCL .  For simplicity, we further 
assumed that *//' LCLCC LLL ∂∂=∂∂= .  The bank’s total costs )(Z  are composed 
of deposit payment cost, deposit insurance cost, and administrative loan cost, 
respectively.** 
 
                                                           
** The swap transaction between the two banks also involves an intermediary.  The intermediary 
receives a small fee for arranging the transaction.  The marginal swap transactions costs, the marginal 
administrative deposit costs, the fixed costs are omitted for simplicity because they will have the same 
qualitative effect on the optimal loan-rate settings as the marginal administrative loan costs. 
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Following a number of previous writers (see, for example, Merton, 1977; Crouhy 
and Galai, 1991; Mullins and Pyle, 1994; Lin and Teng, 2001), the objective function 
at the end of the period as described by Equation (5) has the features of a contingent 
claim, which is written on the current market value of the bank’s earning assets.  
Applying Mullins and Pyle, the bank’s market value of equity capital can be a 
Black-Scholes value of call options effectively purchased by the shareholders of the 
bank.  To illustrate this, we rewrite Equation (5) as  
 
)(),( 1
* dNRRVS LL=                                               (6) 
)()]}(),()11()[1({ 2
*
,
** dNeRRLRRL
q
KRZ LLLL
µ−
−−++−−  
 
where, 
}ˆ
2
1]
])11()[1(
{[ln1 2
*
1 σµ
σ
++
−−++−
=
∧
LL
q
KRZ
Vd  
σˆ12 −= dd  
11,
2
1
22 2ˆ σσρσσσ vvv −+=  
DRR −=µ  
 
Equation (6) separates the bank’s equity value into two components.  The first 
component is the bank’s risk adjusted present value earned from its risky assets 
expressed by the combined standard deviation of the return of the portfolio.  The 
second component is the risk adjusted present value of the bank’s net obligations to its 
initial depositors above and beyond its default-free net lending in the interbank market 
with its non-interest costs.  In this objective function, the cumulative standard 
normal distributions of )( 1dN  and )( 2dN  are the risk adjusted factors of the two 
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components.  2σˆ  is the variance with vσ  and 1σ  being the instantaneous 
standard derivation of the rates of return on the risky and default-free assets, 
respectively.  1,vρ  is the instantaneous correlation coefficient between the two 
earning assets of the bank’s portfolio.  µ  is the net deposit spread rate, which is the 
difference between R  and DR . 
 
 
III.  Equilibrium 
 
The first-order conditions for an optimum of Equation (6) are 
 
0)())](1')(1(  '[)( 2
*
21 =∂
∂
+
∂
∂
++−−
∂
∂
− dNe
R
L
R
L
q
KqRCdN
R
V
LL
L
L
µ             (7-1) 
 
0)())](1')(1('[)( 2*
*
*21* =∂
∂
+
∂
∂
++−−
∂
∂
− dNe
R
L
R
L
q
KqRCdN
R
V
LL
L
L
µ              (7-2) 
 
Equations (7-1) and (7-2) determine both the bank’s optimal NSP and SP loan 
rates, hence its earning-asset portfolio size and composition.  We assumed that the 
equilibrium is Cournot-Nash.  There are two reasons for this assumption.  First, a 
conjectural variation demonstrates market conducting when firms recognize their 
interdependence.  In this model, the bank is an imperfectly competitive financial 
institution that “produces” two loans of NSP and SP.  A product nature rather than a 
competitive nature of conjectural variation demonstrates market conducting when the 
bank recognizes the independence between the two loans.  This recognition allows 
us to rule out cooperative or collusive behavior in multi-loan setting.  Second, for 
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purposes of simplicity, we used a Cournot-Nash nature between two loans (the bank’s 
swap-performing loan and its counterparty’s loan) to analyze the swap transactions.  
It should be apparent in what follows that this abstraction does not affect the basic 
conclusions of this paper.  Intuitively, both the equilibrium conditions demonstrate 
that the risk-adjusted present value of the bank’s marginal loan repayment earned 
from its risky assets equals the risk-adjusted present value of the marginal net 
obligations of the loan-rate settings. 
 
Equation (7-1) indicates that the bank’s marginal loan repayment value earned 
from the risky assets of its NSP loan rate is less than 1− , 1/ −<∂∂ LRV .  That is, 
the bank will operate on the elastic portion of its NSP loan demand curve, just as a 
monopolistic bank would do.  This negative value in turn implies that the bank’s 
NSP and SP loan are complements.  This negative value also implies that NSP and 
SP loans may be substitutes since the NSP loan from a change in its loan rate (denoted 
by the own effect, LRL ∂∂ / , in the model) is generally assumed to be more significant 
than the SP loan from a change in LR  (denoted by the cross effect, LRL ∂∂ /* ).  
Thus, we may argue that the bank tends to conduct the loan portfolio swap to manage 
credit-related losses through diversification where NSP and SP loans are either 
complements or substitutes.  This is especially true to the extent that the bank is 
heavily involved in industry-based lending.  The bank’s NSP and NP loans are 
complements when its borrowers may be classified as up- and down-stream firms in a 
particular industry, substitutes when its borrowers may be recognized as competitive 
firms in a particular industry. 
 
In addition, the marginal net obligations of NSP loan rate, 
)1/')(1(' 2 +++ qKqRCL , are positive.  This term demonstrates both the marginal 
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administrative cost of serving NSP loans (denoted by the cost effect of the NSP 
loan-rate setting in the model) and the marginal revenue of borrowing/lending in the 
interbank market (denoted by the portfolio redistribution effect of the NSP loan-rate 
setting).  The cost effect indicates the behavioral modes of the firm-theoretic 
approach while the portfolio redistribution effect demonstrates the return-risk 
trade-off conditions of the portfolio-theoretic approach.  Thus, this equilibrium 
integrates the risk conditions of the portfolio-theoretic approach with the 
firm-theoretic approach market modes.  The basic concept of this integrated 
approach presented in this paper follows Sealey (1980) concerning bank rate-setting 
behavior.  The interpretation of equation (7-2) follows a similar argument as in the 
case of equation (7-1). 
 
 
IV.  Comparative Statics 
 
In this section, we consider the effects on optimal loan-rate setting from changes 
in the model parameters.  The second-order conditions and the unique market 
equilibrium are: 
 
0*
2
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2
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2
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*2
LL RRS ∂∂∂  indicates the bank’s best-reply operation between its NSP and SP 
loan-rate settings, and denotes a change in the marginal interest value of NSP 
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loan-rate setting influenced by a change in the SP loan-rate setting.  Applying Bulow, 
Geankopolos, and Klemperer’s (1985) product portfolio selection in which to compete, 
we demonstrate that both the bank’s NSP and SP loan-rate settings are strategic 
substitutes if a given bank’s marginal interest value of NSP loan-rate setting falls 
when the bank increases the SP loan-rate setting: the bank’s best-reply function is 
downward sloping.  The strategic substitutes in the model demonstrate the bank’s 
best loan composition management allocation in its earning-asset portfolio.  This 
demonstration analyzes a best-reply effect that the loan contract has on swaptions.  It 
is a case of strategic complements when the bank decreases the SP loan-rate setting: 
the bank’s best-reply function is upward sloping.  The interpretation of 
LL RRS ∂∂∂ *2  follows a similar argument as in the case of *2 LL RRS ∂∂∂ . 
 
First, consider the impact on the bank’s NSP and SP loan-rate settings from a 
change in its own probability of ),()1( *** LLL RRLR+  defaulting, 
*
Lα .  The 
comparative static results derived from equations (7-1) and (7-2) are presented in the 
following: 
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Note that LL RLLRV ∂∂−+=∂∂ *)1( η  and **** LLLL RLRLRRV ∂∂−∂∂=∂∂ , 
where η  is the NSP loan demand interest rate elasticity at the loan rate LR .  Since 
η  is proportional to the Lerner index of the bank, η  is a measure of the bank’s 
market power.††  If the bank’s credit deteriorates (hence *Lα  increases), then the 
magnitude of the SP loan default risk increases.  If the bank has a greater market 
power in both the L  and *L  markets and both products are substitutes, then an 
increase in the bank’s credit deterioration will decrease the optimal NSP loan rate and 
increase the optimal SP loan rate under strategic substitutes.  Because the bank’s 
required credit risk of the SP loan increases, the bank will pay a lower fixed coupon.  
Therefore, the optimal SP loan-rate is set increasingly and the SP loan demand 
decreases.  In an imperfect NSP loan market, the bank must reduce its loan rate in 
order to increase the amount of loans due to the nature of the substitutes in the bank’s 
loan portfolio.  Thus, if the bank is sufficiently powerful in both the loan markets 
and these two loans are substituted, in which the bank’s borrowers are recognized as 
competitors in a particular industry, we present the following proposition. 
 
Proposition1: An increase in the bank’s SP loan credit deterioration decreases the NSP 
loan rate and increases the SP loan rate under strategic substitutes and 
has an indeterminate effect on the bank’s NSP and SP’s loan rates under 
strategic complements. 
 
                                                           
†† See Tirole (1988, p.66). 
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The strategic substitutes between two heterogeneous loans demonstrate that the 
bank increasing its NSP loan rate is the best response when it decides to decrease its 
SP loan rate.  Rather than emphasizing a bank and its rival’s best-reply competitive 
strategy in Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer’s sense, we suggest an interactive 
strategy of the loan portfolio allocation under swap transactions.  Both loan markets 
faced by the bank are imperfectly competitive so that rate settings are the relevant 
behavioral modes not only in both markets but also in its loan portfolio management 
under swap transactions.  Thus, Proposition 1 demonstrates a strategy that integrates 
a swap transaction with the market conditions and rate-setting behavioral modes of 
the bank. 
 
Second, consider the impact on the bank’s NSP and SP loan-rate settings from a 
charge in its counterparty’s probability of )()1( AA RLR+  defaulting, Aα .  The 
comparative static results derived from Equations (7-1) and (7-2) are: 
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If the bank has a greater market power in both the L  and *L  markets and both 
products are substitutes, then an increase in the counterparty’s credit deterioration will 
increase the optimal NSP loan rate and decrease the optimal SP loan rate under 
strategic substitutes.  The interpretation of this result follows a similar argument as 
in the case of a change in *Lα .  Basically, just as a higher-rated bond issuer pays a 
lower coupon, the higher-rated swap party, relatively speaking, due to an increase in 
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its conterparty’s credit deterioration, must pay (receive) a lower (higher) fixed coupon.  
In imperfect loan markets, the bank must decrease the SP loan rate and increase the 
NSP loan rate in order to increase the SP loan and decrease the NSP loan for the 
bank’s risky earning-asset portfolio.  To summarize, if the bank is sufficiently 
powerful in both the loan markets, and these two loans are substitutes, then a 
proposition is stated as follows. 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the bank’s counterparty’s credit deterioration increases 
the NSP loan rate and decreases the SP loan rate under strategic 
substitutes and has an indeterminate effect on the bank’s NSP and SP’s 
loan rates under strategic complements. 
 
Third, consider the impact on the bank’s NSP and SP loan-rate settings from a 
change in the capital-to-deposits ratio.  Implicit differentiations of the first-order 
conditions with respect to q  yield  
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If the bank has a greater market power and L  and *L  are substitutes, then an 
increase in the capital-to-deposits ratio will increase the optimal NSP loan-rate setting 
and decrease the optimal SP loan-rate setting under strategic substitutes.  Intuitively, 
as the bank is forced to increase its capital relative to its deposit level, it must provide 
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a return to a larger equity base.  One way the bank may attempt to augment its total 
returns is by shifting its investments to its SP loan (by decreasing the SP loan rate) 
and away from its investments to its NSP loan (by increasing the NSP loan rate) as 
well as the interbank market.  Thus, capital regulation encourages the bank to 
conduct a loan portfolio swap; accordingly, credit swaps reduce credit risk through 
diversification.  The results observed from Equations (10-1) and (10-2) are stated in 
the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in the capital-to-deposits ratio increases the NSP loan rate 
and decreases the SP loan rate under strategic substitutes and has an 
indeterminate effect on the bank’s NSP and SP’s loan rate under 
strategic complement. 
 
Finally, it is of interest to consider the impact on the bank’s NSP and SP loan-rate 
settings from a change in the deposit insurance premium.  Differentiating the 
first-order conditions with respect to the deposit insurance premium yields 
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The results from Equations (11-1) and (11-2) are demonstrated in the following 
proposition.  We note that the results are limited to two assumptions: the bank is 
sufficiently powerful in both the loan markets and these two loans are substitutes. 
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Proposition 4: An increase in the deposit insurance premium increases the NSP loan 
rate and decreases the SP loan rate under strategic substitutes and has 
an indeterminate effect on the bank’s NSP and SP loan rates under 
strategic complements. 
 
The interpretation of this result follows a similar argument as in the case of a 
change in capital-to-deposits ratio.  Basically, an increase in the cost of deposit 
insurance encourages the bank to shift investments to its risky assets from default-free 
assets (see Zarruk and Madura, 1992, p.148).  Proposition 4 implies that an increase 
in the cost of deposit insurance encourage the bank to shift investments to its SP loans 
from NSP loans.  This implication is consistent with Zarruk and Madura’s finding if 
an increase in the deposit insurance does not decrease the bank’s total loan portfolio 
amount.  Thus, Proposition 4 provides an alternative observation for the loan 
portfolio size determination. 
 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, a firm-theoretic model was developed to study a loan-rate-setting 
bank operating a loan portfolio swap credit derivative for controlling credit risk.  
This model shows how credit risk, capital regulation and deposit insurance conditions 
jointly determine the optimal loan-rate decisions.  Our main point is that in a sense, 
the most obvious application of our results is to the theory of how a bank should 
select a lending loan portfolio in which to compete.  The strategic effect on one 
lending market in another market must be considered.  This is especially true to the 
extent that a bank is heavily involved in industry-based or geography-based lending 
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and attempts to manage and control its credit risk through diversification. 
 
When the bank has greater market power and both loans are substitutes, we find 
that the optimal NSP loan rate is negatively related to the bank’s credit deterioration, 
positively related to the credit deterioration of the bank’s counterparty, to the 
capital-to-deposits ratio, and to the deposit insurance premium under strategic 
substitutes.  However, the comparative-static results of the optimal SP loan rate 
follow a contrary argument as in the above optimal NSP loan rate case.  Our findings 
provide alternative explanations for bank behavior that integrates the risk 
considerations of loan portfolio swap with the market conditions, regulations, and 
loan-rate-setting behavioral asset management modes. 
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